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Andrew Jeffersona, Simon Turnerb and Steffen Jensenc
aDIGNITY, Copenhagen, Denmark; bUniversity of Copenhagen, Denmark; cAalborg University,
Denmark
ABSTRACT
This Introduction to the special issue develops a theoretical argument around the
interrelations of space and time in sites of confinement by exploring the
relationships between ghettos, camps, places of detention, prisons and the like with
a focus on those people who are confined, encamped, imprisoned, detained, stuck,
or forcibly removed and who are doing their utmost to cope or escape. We explore
how life is lived in and across these sites of confinement by focusing on the tactics
of everyday life and hope while being mindful of how ever-present forms of
abjection, even death are constitutive elements of these sites. Stuckness, from this
inter-disciplinary perspective, is not simply a function of the spatial form it takes.
Crucially, the argument goes, we need to understand how temporality animates
stuckness as an important dimension of confinement.
KEYWORDS Stuckness; confinement; mobility; temporality; prison; camp; ghetto
Loic Wacquant has observed that there are ‘striking similarities and intriguing parallels’
between prisons and ghettos (Wacquant 2001). Wacquant explores how prisons and
ghettos constitute a single, unified system and investigates the structural similarities
between them. Others, often historians, have similarly considered different sites of
confinement (ghettos, townships, camps, leper colonies, etc.) under a single frame
(Brown & Dikkoter 2007). In this special issue we pursue a novel argument about
the relationship between ghettos, camps, places of detention, prisons and so on with
a focus on those people who are confined, encamped, imprisoned, detained, stuck, or
forcibly removed and who are doing their utmost to cope or escape. Collectively, the
articles gathered here contribute to a theoretical argument about the interrelations of
space and time in sites of confinement, while illuminating the subjective experience
of confinement across different sites.1 From a point of departure in anthropology
and anthropological studies with important contributions from criminology, geography
and philosophy, the contributions explore how life is lived in and across these sites of
confinement by focusing on the tactics of everyday life and hope while being mindful of
how ever-present forms of abjection, even death are constitutive elements of these sites.
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Stuckness, from this inter-disciplinary perspective, is not simply a function of the spatial
form it takes. Crucially, we need to understand how temporality animates stuckness as
an important dimension of confinement. Death, the ultimate temporal boundary,
emerges as particularly significant in this regard.
The articles focus on the empirical question of how structures of stuckness, confine-
ment and forced mobility impact on the possibilities of ‘making life’. Together, the
articles suggest new ways of thinking about the way temporality and spatiality intersect
and overlap in the lives of people struggling to manage conditions of what Berlant
(2010) has termed ‘compromised ordinariness,’ at the same time as they illuminate
compromised lives in specific locations (Palestine, Sierra Leone, South Africa, northern
Australia, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua).
For us, the ultimate stake is the connection or opposition between involuntary
confinement and forced mobility, on the one hand, and desired place-making and
the freedom to move on the other. This might at first sight seem cryptic but it is
simply to say that on the one side we have people trapped and confined against their
will or forced to move through war, impossible livelihood opportunities, eviction or
removal. And on the other side we have people’s desire to occupy particular places,
to make homes, to build legacies for their children or to move – locally or globally –
in pursuit of fresh opportunities and new challenges. The point is that there is a
need to go beyond ideas that equate place with confinement and mobility with freedom.
Sites of confinement, be they prisons, ghettos, re-education camps, or refugee camps
are characterised by flows and enclosures of people: dislocated, confined, stuck or
mobile; and caught between the temporary and the permanent; between exclusion
and inclusion; and between boundaries and their transgression. Empirical similarities
can be identified across sites of confinement. This is, in itself, not of much analytical
interest. Rather, it constitutes a point of departure for our analyses. What we do in
this special issue is to pursue the effects of these various sites in terms of creating ‘stuck-
ness’ and ask how this (sense of) ‘stuckness’ can best be characterised. In what follows
we reserve the term confinement for the frameworks – both spatial and temporal – that
structure life in camps, ghettos, prisons and so on; and we propose the term stuckness to
refer to the way confinement is experienced, sensed and lived. The experience of stuck-
ness is not simply an expression of physical confinement and spatial closure but
expresses the way people make sense of confining dynamics and practices. To be
stuck is a quality (not simply an effect or a product), we argue, of confined lives
worthy of further exploration. While stuckness has been an object of anthropological
inquiry for some time (Vigh 2009; Hage 2009; Hoffmann 2011), we suggest that as a
quality, it is best studied across disciplines. Hence, while anthropological work is
evident in the contributions, they crucially also rely on and speak from other disciplines
in order to enrich the analyses of stuckness and confinement.
The sites addressed in this special issue are typically understood through spatial
metaphors. The term confinement conjures up images of spatial limitations, walls,
fences and enclosures. Similarly, stuckness seems to imply spatial immobility –
people are stuck somewhere. Mobility, too, is a spatial metaphor, linking movement
in space with freedom of choice, political agency and social potentialities, and implying
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that immobility leads to the opposite: un-freedom, lack of political agency and social
stagnation. In this introduction, we begin unpacking these concepts, unveiling the
spatial bias and inserting temporality into the debate. This introduction is divided
into three sections. In the first section, we explore spatial immobility and what it
means to be stuck in space. How does spatial immobility interact with social and exis-
tential immobility? Can confined spaces create new possibilities and freedoms in terms
of identities? In the second section, we consider the importance of temporality for
understandings of confinement and stuckness, thinking further about what it means
to be stuck in time. To be existentially and socially stuck is not just a question of
being stuck in place but equally about being stuck in time. It is the sense of not
making progress, of not seeing a future, which leads to a sense of stuckness that may
linger. Perhaps the most extreme form of temporal stuckness is the imminent presence
of death, experienced as a threat to immortality (cf Yalom 1980), a theme to which we
(and our contributors) return. A third section presents what we refer to as three inter-
related fault lines that we have identified as heuristic tools through which to frame the
debates that the contributors address. These are homology / continuity; exclusion /
inclusion and hope / abjection. The framing resists the inclination to privilege one
side over the other, preferring to dwell on their both/and quality as productive, consti-
tutive features of social practice.
Stuck in Space and the Ambiguous Potentiality of Freedom
The literature on the relationship between space and freedom is vast, multi-disci-
plinary, and suffused with tensions. For example, globalisation theories celebrate
the mobile and the unbounded (Appadurai 1996) and/or bemoan those who are
bound by space (Bauman 1998). Ghetto and prison studies, similarly link spatial
immobility to loss of freedom and assume a number of other losses, Sykes’ study
of the pains of imprisonment being a classic example (Sykes 1958).2 But a link
between mobility and certain forms of liberated subjectivity cannot simply be
assumed. This point has been forcefully argued from within the new sub-discipline
known as carceral geography, a field of study that aims to combine insights from
critical geography with insights from prison studies (Moran et al. 2013; Moran
2012). Carceral geographers have sought, like us, to destabilise the categories
through which confinement is typically understood.3 For example, the point is
well made that mobility itself can be punitive and has always been an element of
routines within prisons. As Gill puts it ‘mobility is perfectly commensurate with
confinement and has been used as a constituent element of confinement within
prisons for many years’ (in Gill 2013: 20; Moran et al. 2013: 20).
Refugee studies, on the other hand, tend to equate losses with forced mobility.
Stephen Lubkemann provides a strong critique of commonsense understandings of
the link between displacement and loss in refugee studies, where he argues
that preconceived notions about the relationship between mobility and social place tend to
render invisible an entire category of people whose lives are as profoundly (and sometimes
more) disturbed by the effects of conflict on the mobility environment as are the lives of
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wartime migrants. However, this category of the ‘displaced’ ultimately move little if at all. (Lub-
kemann 2008: 456).
He coins the term ‘forced immobility’ to capture those whose lives have been dis-
placed although they never moved physically.4 Elsewhere, he uses the term ‘lifescapes’
to capture the ways in which people try to create meaningful lives and embed them-
selves socially across and between spaces as much as within them. He further argues
that
(t)he presumption that migration will result in the package of losses associated with the term
‘displacement’ tends to pre-empt analytical space in ways that preclude posing questions
about what other possible meanings and effects, other than loss and disempowerment, may
result from wartime migration. (Lubkemann 2008: 456).
It is this preemption and preclusion that is disrupted in this special issue by directing
attention specifically to the meanings, people ascribe to their various experiences of
being more or less confined in space or time.5
In their own right and individually, sites of confinement – prisons, camps, ghettos
etc. – are central to the emergence of the social sciences, because they radicalise the
central question of the relationship between structure and agency. This notion comes
out in, for instance, (the reading of) Goffmann’s Total Institutions (Goffman 1961),
in the almost omnipotent Panopticon, explored by Foucault (Foucault 1977) or the
habitus emerging in ghetto-settings, as analyzed by Bourdieu in the Weight of the
World (Bourdieu 1993). However, while each of these analyses aims to explore life as
well as structure, they arguably end up reproducing the all-powerful presence of the
confining institutions. While there are clearly structures that bear down on people
and undermine their aspirations to move when they wish or stay when it suits them,
we cannot assume anything about (human) agency only by exploring the institutions
that confine them. Instead we must explore, empirically, the means by which these
structures of confinement are lived, negotiated, resisted and/or reproduced in daily
life and through social practice.
While space is clearly central for how we may approach confinement and stuckness
from the point of view of an ambiguous freedom, temporal dimensions are equally
evident, for instance in the focus on aspirations. One of the more interesting attempts
to overcome the unhelpful distinction between space and time is to invoke Zygmunt
Bauman’s classical analysis of tourists and vagabonds (1998). In this text, Bauman
(1998) explains how the world has become bifurcated between what he calls the first
world and the second world – the former being increasingly independent of the latter.
Residents of the first world live in time, space does not matter for them, since spanning every
distance is instantaneous. (…) Residents in the second world live in space – heavy, resilient,
untouchable – which ties down time and keeps it beyond the residents’ control. Their time is
void; in their time “nothing ever happens”. (Bauman 1998: 45).
In this world – similar to the picture that Sassen paints in relation to global expul-
sions taking place where the rich no longer need the poor and where states no longer
can match trans-global capital and expertise and regulation (Sassen 2014) – the
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inhabitants of the first world are tourists when they move, choosing to move at their
leisure because they are uninhibited by space. While the inhabitants of Bauman’s
‘second world’ have no control over space and have time in abundance, this does not
mean that they do not move. The difference is that when they move, they do so
without any control over space and without ease. They become what he calls the vaga-
bonds of our time. We raise this example because it nicely demonstrates that while we
cannot assume a link between (im-)mobility and (un-)freedom, time and space are still
important, and they play different roles according to the position one occupies in the
world. Bauman’s ambition is to diagnose a world out of balance. While we sympathise
with this ambition, he introduces a ‘new’ form of distinction – that some live in space
and others live in time. Hence, there is still a need to address confinement and stuckness
in terms of temporality in its own right.
Stuck in Time, Relationality and the Potentiality of Death
While there are certainly many ways to explore the relationship between temporality,
stuckness and confinement, this special issue emphasises two specific routes, namely
via issues of hope, foreboding and anticipation on the one hand and issues of relation-
ality, kinship or relatedness (Carstens 2000) on the other. Below, we outline these two
ways of looking at temporality in relation to confinement. We begin with the relational
and move towards anticipation, foreboding and hope.
To think of time through relations is to recognise the way we invest in time collec-
tively and often for others. We project ourselves through time, even across generations,
via our relationships to significant other; to kin. Relationships with significant others are
infused with obligations and obligations always exist across time. The ubiquity of obli-
gation and debt relationships is such that to be free of obligation or expectation is equiv-
alent to social death. The hope for a different future – and the concomitant fear that
there is no other future – is often seen as an individual endeavour. However, narratives
and structures of kinship – and in particular of offspring – in the cases raised in this
special issue, demonstrate that the projected future may also be the future of kin. In
other words, while individuals may see no way out of the present ‘circuit of confine-
ment’ – whether the camp, the prison, the ghetto or the reservation – they continue
to struggle ‘for the sake of’ their offspring. The idea of kinship is itself a way of imagin-
ing time and immortality. Kinship – or what Janet Carstens (2000) calls cultures of
relatedness – seems to offer some of the few possible support networks in situations
of desperation and in the absence of other structures of support. As da Cunha (2008)
in her analysis of the relation between prison and low income and criminalised,
urban neighbourhoods in Portugal argues, kinship structures are absolutely central
for survival in the prison at the same time as they are reconfigured in relation to incar-
ceration. Waltorp and Jensen’s analysis (this issue) equally confirms the centrality and
amenability of kinship structures under duress, as favours and counter favours between
kin are drawn inside and outside the prisons. Jefferson and Segal (this issue) also touch
on the centrality of offspring for parents in situations of stuckness, highlighting the
tiredness associated with uncertain futures for children and the grief and sense of
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foreboding associated with children dying. Eric Worby’s (Worby 2010) exploration of
how Zimbabwean migrants newly arrived in Johannesburg, attempt to avoid contact
with ever-craving kin who demand housing, food, access to contacts and jobs in a situ-
ation where all resources are scarce also offers a rather tragic streak to the account of
kinship. Similar demands are identified in relation to demands from inmates on their
families (Das et al. 2008).
While time in camps, prisons and ghettos is often portrayed as time on standby – as
if time stands still while real time continues to move relentlessly on, creating an angst of
being left behind and becoming out of touch – kinship ties break this timelessness. They
link the inside to the outside – as when inmates stay in touch with family on the outside.
And they link the present to hopes for a future; a future that the individual may not
enjoy but which he or she may enjoy through their offspring.
One of the most striking characteristics of all the cases explored in this special issue,
is the way in which the control of time is taken away from people, or forced upon
people, and how the sense of having a future or not is essential to the strategies that
they adapt in the present. In other words, the un-freedom of their confinement is
often more temporal than spatial, and what seems at stake is the individual’s ability
(or not) to imagine, or propel themselves toward, a future (Turner 2015). Can the Cape-
tonian prisoner imagine a future beyond confinement when the prison and the town-
ship are so closely entangled, as Jensen and Waltorp show in this issue and as da Cunha
(2008) suggests in her analysis of what she calls the carceral continuum?
Hope is perceived by some scholars as a means through which to imagine a better,
distant future, thus enabling the individual to endure suffering in the present. Hopeful-
ness, Ghassan Hage argues, is ‘a disposition to be confident in the face of the future, to
be open to it and welcoming to what it will bring, even if one does not know for sure
what it will bring’ (Hage 2003: 24). An alternative orientation to locating hope as an
intrinsic capacity, or disposition, is to look for signs of hope exhibited in everyday prac-
tice, to ask how hope is maintained against all the odds, to examine the obstinacy of
hope. If hope ‘is the human attribute which simultaneously reconciles us to our onto-
logical status as traveller and propels us along the path to ourselves’ (Webb 2007: 69)
then we need to attend to the propellant work that hope does rather than simply posit-
ing its existence or absence as a disposition (Jefferson 2014). This is where we find the
notion of anticipation useful (Vigh 2011). We understand anticipation to be an embo-
died practice, a subtle sensing of what the future holds whether it be positively flavoured
or laced with foreboding.
Several of the articles in this special issue explore situations where hopes for a
(better) future seem impossible and where death appears as an ever-present potentiality,
overshadowing the lives of the living. In his contribution, Dennis Rodgers illustrates
how urban regeneration and elite politics are closing more and more spaces of hope.
In their article, Jefferson and Segal examine the intertwining of living and dying in situ-
ations of ‘compromised ordinariness’. Similarly, Turner and Løvgren show how death is
ever-present for the young men in Rwanda’s re-education camps. However, the spectre
of death – as a potentiality – does not in itself necessarily obfuscate life or hope totally.
Several scholars have attempted to explore the tension between what Amanda Hammar
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(2014) frames as desperation and creativity. Susan Whyte, for instance, terms acting in
the present in relation to an unknown future as being in the ‘subjunctive mode’ (Whyte
2005) capturing the way propositions and practices are always already suffused with
doubt, fears and hopes. In a similar move, Henrik Vigh uses the term ‘social navigation’
to explore how individuals relate to a future in a constantly moving and indeterminate
terrain (Vigh 2009).
Fault Lines
We have identified three fault lines that emerge from the different contributions to this
special issue, and that usefully frame the subsequent explorations of people’s attempts to
orient themselves and maneuver through, across and between confining sites and tem-
poralities. These fault lines are between homology / continuity; exclusion / inclusion;
and hope / abjection. Below, we unpack these three fault lines in slightly more detail.
Homology / Continuity
This fault line is analytical rather than theoretical. It focuses attention on the relation-
ship between sites. While the comparison between prisons, ghettos and camps intui-
tively makes sense, what kind of sense is it? When Wacquant argues that the ghetto
and prison ‘meet and mesh’ (2001), he sees them as part of a continuum in a
grander picture of confinement. In a similar manner, Angela Davis (1998) explores
the prison industrial complex where the ghetto and the prison become part of a huge
repressive complex, serving the needs of the powerful. In this way, prison and ghetto
do not merely resemble each other; they are part of a system or a world in which
poorer and blacker are confined and excluded. Different sites of confinement do not
only resemble one another. Sometimes they share genealogies or morph from one
type to another. For example, in this issue Michel Agier argues that over time camps
become ghettos, thus challenging the assumption that camps simply immobilise
those who inhabit them while maintaining the idea of a ‘worldwide landscape’ of
places of banishment. For us, the analytical opposition between homology and continu-
ity is about whether we see different sites of confinement in terms of one another or as
part of a continuous system. The latter is what Waltorp and Jensen’s analysis suggests,
as they explore carceral continuums in South Africa. They show how the spatial division
between township and prison is constantly blurred while residents, inside and outside
the prison, struggle hard to both maintain the distinctions and reach across the bound-
aries to produce what they term awkward entanglements. Le Marcis, writing about
prisons in the Ivory Coast, demonstrates homologies between the informal power struc-
tures of the prison and the society outside, claiming that the prison mirrors society.
Clearly, sites of confinement are related to each other either in the way that they
confine people, by being part of a system or a world or being different stages in a
process of confinement. But the nature of the relationship cannot be assumed. If we
want to know how the boundary between inside or outside is constituted, policed
and transgressed, we must approach specific cases empirically. This is what Elizabeth
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Povinelli does when she follows her informants and friends in Northern Australia
across institutional boundaries of ghetto, slum, camps and prison to avoid capture
and continue living their lives. She demonstrates how the formal terminology of the
same site has changed over time, reflecting the political context of the time – from colo-
nial to neo-liberal government. However, for those who inhabit them, these sites are
comparable on the level of the effect they have on life prospects. In this way, they do
not distinguish between sites of confinement but see them as continuous sites of
struggle.
While this special issue to some extent contributes with an understanding that stres-
ses similarities across sites of confinement, to suggest that they are the same or are
experienced identically would clearly be a fallacy. Hence, there is a need to constantly
subject the actual relationship between sites of confinement to interrogation, rather
than assuming specific types of relationships.6
Exclusion / Inclusion
This fault line relates to the intentions of confinement. Is confinement intended to
exclude people from some version of mainstream society, be that polite society
(Jensen 2008) or the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki 1995) or is the purpose one of
disciplining or including, be that in re-education camps (Turner 2014) or in prisons
(Foucault 1977)? Again, the fault line requires us to think through this, rather than
come down on one or the other side. Take South African homelands, for example.
As it has been argued by several scholars (e.g. Ferguson 1994; Platzsky & Walker
1985), the homelands constituted ‘surplus people’s places’, that is, their purpose was
primarily one of exclusion. However, they were clearly also labour reserves in which
capital reproduced labour at no cost to itself (Kopytoff 1989). Hence, the question is
not one of either exclusion or inclusion; it is a question of complex historical trajectories
(Jensen and Zenker 2015). Also in the contributions by Povinelli, and Turner and
Løvgren complex historical trajectories determine the relationship between inclusion
and exclusion. Turner and Løvgren argue that Iwawa camp, located on an uninhabited
island in Lake Kivu, simultaneously removes delinquent youth out of view, while it also
attempts to transform these abject bodies into model citizens of the nation.
As Agier (2009) notes, for Wacquant (2008) the ghetto is created by the distance to
the state, whereas the hyper-ghetto is created by abandonment. While ghettos served a
function as a labour reserve, the hyperghetto is marked by ‘deproletarianization’, by the
fact that its inhabitants no longer play a role for the elite. The question, Agier asks
(Agier 2009: 856), is whether we may see this as a global process, creating ‘territories
of abandonment’. Sassen (2014) equally suggests that post 1980s late capitalism no
longer needs a proletariat, resulting in the expulsion of people and places on a
massive global scale. While these authors provide insights at a global scale, in this
special issue we explore the effects at the local scale for those whom they theorise as
abandoned. Wacquant (2008) claims that the process of confining people to specific ter-
ritories also provided the opportunity to create community, famously so in the Jewish
ghettos and in African-American ghettos on the South side of Chicago. Jensen found
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similar dynamics in South African townships (Jensen 2008). In this issue, Michel Agier
makes a similar argument. However, the hyperghetto of our times, Wacquant argues, is
marked so much by fragmentation and abjection that political identities and commu-
nity can hardly exist. Dennis Rodgers raises similar questions in his contribution to
this special issue, as he explores how urban transformation in Managua has increasingly
marginalised the residents of a particular neighbourhood, which he has studied for
almost two decades. While the marginalisation is primarily social and economic, the
almost insurmountable walls consisting of a set of ring roads within which his interlo-
cutors must strive to cope with a new round of exclusions, give it spatial form.
In this way, confinement invariably excludes and includes, for shorter or for longer
periods of time, sometimes deliberately and sometimes for no apparent reason except
for people being in the way or forgotten; either too visible or invisible. And while
some forms of confinement apparently have the intention of simply excluding
‘human waste’ – such as refugee camps, Guantanamo and ghettos – even these sites
may intend aspects of betterment for later – hypothetical – inclusion into society
(Turner 2010; Jensen 2010). Likewise, sites that appear to have the aim of transforming
outsiders into insiders – such as prisons and education camps – de facto often have the
effect of simply excluding, as becomes quite evident in Turner and Løvgren’s contri-
bution where re-education becomes abjection.
Hope / Abjection
Our final fault line is that between hope and abjection. As mentioned, when we explore
confinement, there is a tendency to focus on immobility and lack of agency. However,
even in situations of absolute confinement there is movement of sorts; the lines of flight
that Deleuze and Guattari (1988) insist on. Indeed, ‘absolute’ confinement or ‘total
institutions’ (Goffman 1961) may be misleading misnomers, at least when bandied
about without accompanying empirical analysis. For instance, to stand on the roof of
the largest prison in the Philippines, the New Bilibid Prison, home to some 19,000
inmates, is a sobering experience for all who think of prisons as ‘total institutions’.
Resembling a Brueghel painting, the onlooker sees a beauty pageant taking place in
the distance, between prison gang members; closer, a preacher delivers a sermon;
while to the right, a basketball game is going on. Despite this evidence of the less
than total Philippine prison, a more universal theme emerges when one examines
experiences of confinement. A central trope capturing the problematic of confinement
in Philippine prisons as well as in relocation sites, is that of buryong (Jensen 2014).
While the term denotes an existential fear that the immobility of the present will per-
petuate itself eternally into the future it also captures the need to act to deal with the
sense of desperate stuckness in space and in time. Thus, stuckness is not necessarily
equivalent to passivity. In Jensen’s account, the possibility of succumbing is constantly
present but mostly avoided by his interlocutors through agility, perseverance and
cunning. This resonates, in turn, with the experience of Povinelli and her friends in a
flimsy boat in Northern Australia (but representative of experience more generally)
which she characterises in the following terms: ‘We are neither defeated, nor are we
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successful. We persevere.’ (2011: 115) But, as she poignantly notes, only a few of them in
fact persevered, while many succumbed.
What, then, about those who do not obstinately persevere or for whom death is an
ever-present possibility? This is where abjection enters the picture. In this special issue,
Rodgers directly challenges the insistence on hope in his longitudinal studies of the fate
of ex-gangsters increasingly confined within the perimeters of an ever more excluded
Managua ghetto. More radically, three contributions to this special issue deal directly
with issues of death and mourning. Turner and Løvgren explore how young men are
constantly battling death in a re-education camp to emerge as people – where far
from all make it. While Foucault’s path-breaking study of prisons in Europe (Foucault
1977) leads us to see them as sites of bio-politics, Le Marcis argues in this issue that
colonialism created quite different circumstances in Africa. Le Marcis explores what
he, drawing on Achille Mbembe, calls the necropolitics of the Ivorian prison. And
invoking Chekhov, Jefferson and Segal revisit material from West Africa and Occupied
Palestine to examine the conversion of everyday tiredness in to a sense of abject fore-
boding. Their analysis unpacks the significance of the ‘confines of time’ for people
living under the constantly compromising shadow of violence, poverty, death and
dying. Exhaustion and monotony rather than energy and opportunity are fore-
grounded; hope is largely absent and orientation towards the future takes the form of
foreboding or living towards death. For Jefferson and Segal, this is stuckness.
Related to this is the issue of choice. Lisa Guenther writes of ‘the facticity of being
thrown into a world that one did not choose but with which one must come to
terms in one’s own singular way’ (Guenther 2013: 202). She quotes Fanon writing
about consent: ‘I had to choose. What do I mean? I had no choice’ (Ibid: 227). This
is perhaps the most minimal version of the stuckness thesis – people are stuck with
the world they occupy at the time in which they occupy it. She also quotes Robert
King, a member of the Angola Three held in prison for thirty-two years, referring
back to his time in prison, after release, saying ‘I am still there’. King is not physically
in prison any longer but he is ‘still there’. This is an apt designation of the experience of
abject stuckness. Conditions of confinement leave people ‘still there’ literally, spatially,
temporally and relationally. Being ‘still there’ is one version of what stuckness means
(and the double meaning of ‘still’ is significant here: they remain and they are not
moving (very much)). Whereas orientations to hope seek to make sense of how
people cope against all the odds, focusing on abjection resists well-intentioned projec-
tions of hope onto hopeless experience. Again, hope and abjection are not opposites but
interlinked and often co-present in experience and visibly so under confined
circumstances.
This fault line suggests a series of questions that the articles pursue in different ways:
what choices do people have under extreme, confined, compromised circumstances;
what kind of subjectivities can be formed when the present is circumscribed, and the
future is unknown or as Lauren Berlant (2010: 110) eloquently puts it, when there is
‘no living as if not in a relation to death which is figured in all of the potential loss
that precedes it’? Stuckness, we suggest, is not a choice. Stuckness is a given and for
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many a curse. But a curse with which they (or many of them at least) deal or actively
anticipate, either in the form of hope or foreboding.
In this introduction, we have emphasised the ways in which stuckness, dislocation
and mobility relate to each other through a number of institutional forms of power –
the ghetto, the prison, the camp etc. – which we refer to as confinement. We have
explored how life is lived in and across these sites and argued that stuckness cannot
be simply understood as a function of the spatial form it takes. We need to understand
how temporality always already animates stuckness, revealed perhaps most visibly by
the ubiquity of death. Against – or complementing – this tragic perspective, Povinelli,
at the end of her ethnography, offers us one small glimpse of hope when, rather than
retaining focus on the deprivations and struggles of her friends in the Northern Terri-
tory, Australia, she shifts attention to a police car passing through a gate on the road
away from the community, hinting subtly at the possibility of hope and life, even
under highly compromised and compromising conditions.
Notes
1. It is worth noting that our focus is not on sites of voluntary confinement, that is, not on the
experience of hermits, monks or nuns, or recluses or such like, though we suspect that the per-
spectives shared in this collection would provide food for thought for scholars with such
interests.
2. Sykes influentially identified four deprivations associated with imprisonment: deprivation of
liberty; deprivation of goods and services; deprivation of sexual relationships; deprivation of
autonomy.
3. The approach of carceral geographers resonates with our own orientation to the extent that they
too are concerned with multiple sites considering specifically the analytical entwining of impri-
sonment and migrant detention and with the subjective experiences of confinement (see Moran
et al. 2017).
4. In prisons we see a flip side of this: populations who are ‘in custody’ are typically understood as
static and immobile whereas evidence of movement is widespread be it prisoner arrivals / depar-
tures / transfers, cell changes; disciplinary sanctions and so on.
5. Conscious of Martha Nussbaum’s critique of Sen we are also keen to avoid implying by our focus
on stuckness and confinement that freedom is a universally desirable ‘general all-purpose social
good’ (Nussbaum 2003: 44).
6. Relatedly, the tendency evident in popular consciousness and critical scholarship to reproduce
fixed notions of ‘the’ prison has been critically analysed by Armstrong and Jefferson (2017).
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